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Abstract
We solve the stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium (SGNE) problem
in merely monotone games with expected value cost functions. Specifi-
cally, we present the first distributed SGNE seeking algorithm for mono-
tone games that only requires one proximal computation (e.g., one pro-
jection step) and only one pseudo-gradient evaluation per iteration.
Our main contribution is to build upon the relaxed forward–backward
operator splitting by Malitsky (Mathematical programming, 2019) and in
turn to show almost sure convergence to a SGNE when the expected value
of the pseudo-gradient is approximated by the average over a number of
random samples.
Keywords 1. Stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium problems, stochastic vari-
ational inequalities.
1 Introduction
In a generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP), some agents interact with
the aim of minimizing their individual cost functions under some joint feasibility
constraints. Due to the presence of the shared constraints, computing a GNE
is usually hard. Despite this challenge, GNEPs has been studied extensively
within the system and control community, for their applicability, e.g., in energy
markets [38, 25, 17, 30, 23].
Unfortunately, the stochastic counterpart of GNEP is not studied as much
[31, 24, 41]. A stochastic GNEP (SGNEP) is a constrained problem where the
cost functions are expected value functions. Such problems arise when there
is some uncertainty, expressed through a random variable with an unknown
distribution. For instance, a networked Cournot game with market capacity
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constraints and uncertainty in the demand can be modelled as a SGNE [11, 1].
Other examples arise in transportation systems, where the drivers perception
of travel time is a possible source of uncertainty [37], and in electricity markets
where companies should dispatch energy without perfect knowledge of the actual
demand [19].
If the random variable is known, the expected value formulation can be
solved with a standard technique for the deterministic counterpart. In fact, one
possible approach for SGNEPs is to recast the problem as a stochastic varia-
tional inequality (SVI) through the use of the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions.
Then, the problem can be rewritten as a monotone inclusion and possibly solved
via operator splitting techniques. To find a zero of the resulting operator, we
propose a stochastic relaxed forward backward (SRFB) algorithm. Our work is
inspired by [26] where the authors propose a deterministic algorithm to solve a
variational inequality problem. Besides the shared constraints, the additional
difficulty in stochastic GNEPs is that the pseudo-gradient mapping is usually
not directly accessible, for instance because the expected value is hard to ex-
press in closed form or to compute. For this reason, in many cases, the search
for a solution of a SVI should rely on samples of the random variable.
Depending on the number of samples, there are two main methodologies
available: the stochastic approximation (SA) and the sample average approxi-
mation (SAA). The SA scheme was the first one to be proposed [32]. In this
approximation scheme, each agent samples only one realization of the random
variable. While it is computationally light, in general, it requires stronger as-
sumptions on the mappings and on the parameters involved [24, 40, 39]. In the
SAA approach, the expected value is replaced with the average over an increas-
ing number of samples of the random variable. This approach is reasonable, for
instance, in Monte Carlo simulations or in machine learning problems, where
there is a huge number of data available [5, 21].
The ideal algorithm for finding a SGNE, independently on the approxima-
tion scheme, should be distributed, it should converge under weak monotonicity
assumptions and it should be relatively fast. For SVIs, there are several methods
in the literature that satisfy one or more of these criteria. Among others, one
can consider the stochastic preconditioned forward–backward algorithm (SpFB)
[15] for its convergence speed and low computational cost. The downside of this
algorithm is that the pseudo-gradient mapping must be (monotone and) coco-
ercive (see [18] for an example of non convergence in non-cocoercive monotone
games). Similarly, one can consider the stochastic projected reflected gradient
scheme (SPRG) [8, 9] that is fast but requires the so-called weak sharpness
property (which is implied by the cocoercivity) that is, however, hard to check
on the problem data. Nonetheless, weakening the assumption on the pseudo-
gradient to mere monotonicity translates into having computationally expensive
algorithms. In this case, one could dualize the coupling constraints and apply
the extragradient (EG) scheme [21] with two projection steps per iteration or
the forward–backward–forward (FBF) algorithm [5] that has only one projection
but, two evaluations of the pseudo-gradient for each iteration. These consider-
ations are summarized in Table 1, which includes also a comparison with our
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proposed SRFB algorithm. Essentially, for merely monotone games, our SRFB
algorithm has the lowest computational complexity per iteration.
SFBF [5] SEG [21] SPRG [9] SpFB [15] SRFB
Mon. ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓
# prox 1 2 1 1 1
# F 2 2 1 1 1
Table 1: The algorithms that converge under only monotonicity (Mon.) are
marked with ✓. # prox and # F indicate, the number of proximal steps and
the number of evaluations of the pseudo-gradient per iteration, respectively. All
these algorithms use a SAA scheme.
Our main contributions are summarized next:
• We propose the first distributed algorithm with a single proximal compu-
tation (e.g. projection) and a single pseudo-gradient evaluation per iter-
ation for solving (non strictly/strongly monotone, non-cocoercive) mono-
tone stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium problems;
• We show that our algorithm converges to a stochastic generalized Nash
equilibrium under monotonicity of the pseudo-gradient with the sample
average approximation scheme;
• For the stochastic non-generalized Nash equilibrium problem, we show
convergence with both SAA and SA schemes and under some variants of
monotonicity.
We emphasize that, unlike [24, 41, 15], we do not assume that the pseudo-
gradient mapping is strictly/strongly monotone nor cocoercive or similar.
In Section 7.3 we illustrate the computational advantages of our algorithm
with respect to the state of the art.
2 Notation and preliminaries
2.1 Notation
Let R indicate the set of real numbers and let R¯ = R∪{+∞}. 〈·, ·〉 : Rn×Rn → R
denotes the standard inner product and ‖·‖ represents the associated euclidean
norm. We indicate that a matrix A is positive definite, i.e., x⊤Ax > 0, with
A ≻ 0. Given a symmetric Φ ≻ 0, denote the Φ-induced inner product, 〈x, y〉Φ =
〈Φx, y〉. The associated Φ-induced norm, ‖·‖Φ, is defined as ‖x‖Φ =
√〈Φx, x〉.
A⊗B indicates the Kronecker product between matrices A and B. 0m indicates
the vector with m entries all equal to 0. Given N vectors x1, . . . , xN ∈ Rn,
x := col (x1, . . . , xN ) =
[
x⊤1 , . . . , x
⊤
N
]⊤
.
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JF = (I+F )
−1 is the resolvent of the operator F : Rn → Rn and Id indicates
the identity operator. The set of fixed points of the operator F is fixF =
{x ∈ Rn : x = F (x)}. For a closed set C ⊆ Rn, the mapping projC : Rn →
C denotes the projection onto C, i.e., projC(x) = argminy∈C ‖y − x‖. The
residual mapping is, in general, defined as res(xk) =
∥∥xk − projC(xk − F (xk))∥∥ .
Let g be a proper, lower semi-continuous, convex function. We denote the
subdifferential as the maximal monotone operator ∂g(x) := {u ∈ Ω | (∀y ∈
Ω) : 〈y − x, u〉+ g(x) ≤ g(y)}. The proximal operator is defined as proxg(v) :=
argminu∈Ω{g(u) + 12 ‖u− v‖2} = J∂g(v). ιC is the indicator function of the
set C, that is, ιC(x) = 1 if x ∈ C and ιC(x) = 0 otherwise. The set-valued
mapping NC : R
n → Rn denotes the normal cone operator for the the set C ,
i.e., NC(x) = ∅ if x /∈ C,
{
v ∈ Rn| supz∈C v⊤(z − x) ≤ 0
}
otherwise.
2.2 Operator theory
Let us collect some notions on properties of operators. The definitions are taken
from [14]. First, we recall that F is ℓ-Lipschitz continuous if, for ℓ > 0
‖F (x) − F (y)‖ ≤ ℓ ‖x− y‖ for all x, y ∈ dom(F ).
Definition 1 (Monotone operators). Given a mapping F : dom(F ) ⊆ Rn →
Rn, we say that:
• F is (strictly) monotone if for all x, y ∈ dom(F )(x 6= y)
〈F (x)− F (y), x− y〉(>) ≥ 0;
• F is (strictly) pseudomonotone if for all x, y ∈ dom(F )(x 6= y)
〈F (y), x− y〉 ≥ 0⇒ 〈F (x), x − y〉(>) ≥ 0;
• β-cocoercive with β > 0, if for all x, y ∈ dom(F )
〈F (x) − F (y), x− y〉 ≥ β‖F (x)− F (y)‖2;
• F is firmly non expansive if for all x, y ∈ dom(F )
‖F (x)− F (y)‖2 ≤ ‖x− y‖2 − ‖(Id− F )(x) − (Id− F )(y)‖2.
An example of firmly non expansive operator is the projection operator over
a nonempty, compact and convex set [3, Proposition 4.16]. We note that a firmly
non expansive operator is also non expansive and firmly quasinonexpansive [3,
Definition 4.1]. We note that if a mapping is β-cocoercive it is also 1/β-Lipschitz
continuous [3, Remark 4.15].
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3 Stochastic Generalized Nash equilibrium prob-
lems
We consider a set of noncooperative agents I = {1, . . . , N}, each of them choos-
ing its strategy xi ∈ Rni with the aim of minimizing its local cost function
within its feasible strategy set. The local decision set of each agent is indicated
with Ωi, so that for all i ∈ I, xi ∈ Ωi ⊆ Rni .
Besides the local decision set, each agent is subject to some joint feasibility
constraints. In fact, we consider a game with affine coupling constraints Ax ≤ b.
The feasible decision set of each agent i ∈ I is denoted with the set value
mapping
Xi(x−i) :=
{
yi ∈ Ωi | Aiyi ≤ b−
∑N
j 6=iAjxj
}
, (1)
where Ai ∈ Rm×n defines how agent i is involved in the coupling constraints
and b ∈ Rm. Let us set n = ∑Ni=1 ni, then, given Ω = ∏Ni=1Ωi and A =
[A1, . . . , AN ] ∈ Rm×n, the collective feasible set can be written as
X = {y ∈ Ω | Ay − b ≤ 0m} . (2)
Assumption 1 (Constraint qualification). For each i ∈ I, the set Ωi is nonempty,
compact and convex. The set X satisfies Slater’s constraint qualification. 
The local cost function of agent i is defined as
Ji(xi,x−i) = Eξ[Ji(xi,x−i, ξ(ω))] + gi(xi), (3)
for some measurable function Ji : R
n × Rd → R. The cost function Ji of
agent i ∈ I depends on the local variable xi, the decisions of the other players
x−i = col((xj)j 6=i) and the random variable ξ : Ξ → Rd that express the
uncertainty. Eξ represent the mathematical expectation with respect to the
distribution of the random variable ξ(ω)1 in the probability space (Ξ,F ,P). We
assume that E[Ji(x, ξ)] is well defined for all the feasible x ∈ X [31]. Moreover,
the cost function present the typical splitting in a smooth part and a non-smooth
part. The latter is indicated with gi : R
ni → R¯ and it can represent a local cost
or local constraints via the indicator function, i.e. gi(xi) = ιΩi(xi).
Assumption 2 (Cost function convexity). For each i ∈ I, the function gi in
(3) is lower semicontinuous and convex and dom(gi) = Ωi. For each i ∈ I and
x−i ∈ X−i the function Ji(·,x−i) is convex and continuously differentiable. 
Given the decision variables of the other agents x−i, each agent i aims at
choosing a strategy xi, that solves its local optimization problem, i.e.,
∀i ∈ I :
{
min
xi∈Ωi
Ji (xi,x−i)
s.t. Aixi ≤ b−
∑N
j 6=iAjxj .
(4)
From a game theoretic perspective, the solution concept that we are seeking is
that of stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium (SGNE).
1From now on, we use ξ instead of ξ(ω) and E instead of Eξ.
5
Definition 2. A Stochastic Generalized Nash equilibrium is a collective strategy
x∗ ∈ X such that for all i ∈ I
Ji(x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i) ≤ inf{Ji(y,x∗−i) | y ∈ Xi(x−i)}.
In other words, a SGNE is a set of strategies where no agent can decrease
its objective function by unilaterally deviating from its decision.
To guarantee that a SGNE exists, we make further assumptions on the cost
functions [31].
Assumption 3 (Convexity and measurability). For each i ∈ I and for each ξ ∈
Ξ, the function Ji(·,x−i, ξ) is convex, Lipschitz continuous, and continuously
differentiable. The function Ji(xi,x−i, ·) is measurable and for each x−i, the
Lipschitz constant ℓi(x−i, ξ) is integrable in ξ. 
Existence of a SGNE of the game in (4) is guaranteed, under Assumptions
1-3, by [31, Section 3.1] while uniqueness does not hold in general [31, Section
3.2].
Within all the possible Nash equilibria, we focus on those that corresponds
to the solution set of an appropriate stochastic variational inequality. To this
aim, let us denote the pseudo-gradient mapping as
F(x) = col (E[∇x1J1(x1,x−1)], . . . ,E[∇xNJN (xN ,x−N)]) (5)
and let
G(x) = col(∂g1(x1), . . . , ∂gN(xN )). (6)
The possibility to exchange the expected value and the pseudo-gradient in (5)
is guaranteed by Assumption 3. Then, the associated stochastic variational
inequality (SVI) reads as
〈F(x∗),x− x∗〉+
∑
i∈I
{gi(xi)− gi(x∗i )} ≥ 0, for all x ∈ X . (7)
When Assumptions 1-3 hold, any solution of SVI(X ,F) in (7) is a SGNE of
the game in (4) while viceversa does not hold in general. This is because a game
may have a Nash equilibrium while the corresponding VI may have no solution
[29, Proposition 12.7]. We call variational equilibria (v-SGNE) the SGNE that
are also solution of the associated SVI, namely, the solution of the SVI(X ,F)
in (7) where F is described in (5) and X is defined in (2).
Remark 1. Under Assumptions 1-3, the solution set of SVI(X ,F) is non empty
and compact, i.e. SOL(X ,F) 6= ∅ [14, Corollary 2.2.5], that is, a v-SGNE
exists. 
In the remaining part of this section we recast the SGNEP as a monotone
inclusion, i.e., the problem of finding a zero of a set-valued monotone operator.
To this aim, we characterize the SGNE of the game in terms of the Karush–
Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions of the coupled optimization problems in (4).
Let us define the Lagrangian function, for each i ∈ I, with
Li (x, λi) := Ji (xi,x−i) + gi (xi) + λ⊤i (Ax− b),
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where λi ∈ Rm≥0 is the Lagrangian dual variable associated with the coupling
constraints. Then, a set of strategies x∗ is a SGNE if and only if the following
KKT conditions are satisfied [13, Theorem 4.6]:
∀i ∈ I :
{
0 ∈ E[∇xiJi(x∗i ,x∗−i, ξ)] +G (x∗i ) +A⊤i λi
0 ∈ (Ax∗ − b) +NRm
≥0
(λ∗).
(8)
Similarly, we can use the KKT conditions to characterize a variational prob-
lem, studying the Lagrangian function associated to the SVI in (7):
∀i ∈ I :
{
0 ∈ E[∇xiJi(x∗i ,x∗−i, ξ)] +G (x∗i ) +A⊤i λ,
0 ∈ (Ax∗ − b) +NRm
≥0
(λ∗).
(9)
Remark 2. The interest in the KKT conditions comes from [12, Theorem 3.1],
[2, Theorem 3.1] that provide criteria to select SGNE that are also solutions of
the SVI.
Formally, if x∗ is a solution of the SVI(X ,F) in (7) at which the KKT
conditions in (9) hold, then x∗ is a solution of the SGNEP in (4) at which the
KKT conditions in (8) hold with λ1 = λ2 = · · · = λN = λ∗. Vice versa, if
x∗ is a solution of the SGNEP in (4) at which KKT conditions (8) hold with
λ1 = λ2 = · · · = λN = λ∗, then x∗ is a solution of SVI(X ,F) in (7).
Essentially, [12, Theorem 3.1], [2, Theorem 3.1] say that v-SGNE are those
such that the shared constraints have the same dual variable for all the agents.
4 Distributed stochastic relaxed forward–backward
algorithm
In this section we describe the details that leads to the distributed iterations
presented in Algorithm 1.
We suppose that each player i knows its local data Ωi, Ai and bi. Moreover,
the agents have access to a pool of samples of the random variable and are able
to compute, given the actions of the other players x−i, the pseudo-gradient of
their own cost functions E[∇xiJi(xi,x−i, ξ)] (or an approximation, as exploited
later in this section).
The set of agents j whose decisions affect the cost function of angent i,
are denoted by N Ji . Specifically, j ∈ N Ji if the function Ji(xi,x−i) explicitly
depends on xj .
Let us also introduce the graph Gλ = (I, Eλ) through which a local copy of
the dual variable is shared. As mentioned in Remark 2, we seek for a v-SGNE
with consensus of the dual variables. Therefore, along with the dual variable,
agents share through Gλ a copy of an auxiliary variable zi ∈ Rm whose role is to
force consensus. A deeper insight on this variable is given later in this section.
The set of edges Eλ of the multiplier graph Gλ, is given by: (i, j) ∈ Eλ if player
j share its {λj , zj} with player i. For all i ∈ I, the neighbouring agents in Gλ
form the set N λi = {j ∈ I : (i, j) ∈ Eλ}. In this way, each agent controls his own
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Algorithm 1 Stochastic Relaxed Forward Backward (SRFB)
Initialization: x0i ∈ Ωi, λ0i ∈ Rm≥0, and z0i ∈ Rm.
Iteration k: Agent i
(1): Updates the variables
x¯ki = (1 − δ)xki + δx¯k−1i
z¯ki = (1 − δ)zki + δz¯k−1i
λ¯ki = (1 − δ)λki + δλ¯k−1i
(2): Receives xkj for all j ∈ N Ji and zkj , λkj for j ∈ N λi , then updates:
xk+1i = proxgi [x¯
k
i − αi(Fˆi(xki ,xk−i, ξki ) +A⊤i λki )]
zk+1i = z¯
k
i − νi
∑
j∈Nλi
wi,j(λ
k
i − λkj )
λk+1i = projRm≥0{λ¯
k
i + τi(Aix
k
i − bi)
− τ
∑
j∈Nλi
wi,j [(z
k
i − zkj )− (λki − λkj )]}
decision variable and a local copy of the dual variable λi and of the auxiliary
variable zi and, through the graphs, it obtains the other agents variables.
Assumption 4 (Graph connectivity). The multiplier graph Gλ is undirected
and connected. 
The weighted adjacency matrix associated to Gλ is denoted withW ∈ RN×N .
Then, letting D = diag{d1, . . . , dN} where di =
∑N
j=1 wi,j is the degree of agent
i, the associated Laplacian is given by L = D −W ∈ RN×N . It follows from
Assumption 4 that L = L⊤.
Let us now rewrite the KKT conditions in (9) in compact form as
0 ∈ T (x,λ) :=
[
F(x) +G(x) +A⊤λ
NRm
≥0
(λ)− (Ax− b)
]
. (10)
T : X ×Rm≥0 ⇒ Rn×Rm is a set-valued mapping and it follows that the v-SGNE
of the game in (4) correspond to the zeros of the mapping T .
The operator T can be written as a summation of two operators
A :
[
x
λ
]
7→
[
F(x)
b
]
+
[
0 A⊤
−A 0
] [
x
λ
]
B :
[
x
λ
]
7→
[
G(x)
NRm
≥0
(λ)
]
.
(11)
To force consensus on the dual variables, the authors in [38] proposed the
Laplacian constraint Lλ = 0. This is why, to preserve monotonicity, we expand
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the two operators A and B in (11) and introduce the auxiliary variable z =
col(z1, . . . , zN) ∈ RNm. Let us first define L = L ⊗ Idm ∈ RNm×Nm and A =
diag{A1, . . . , AN} ∈ RNm×n, where L is the laplacian of Gλ and Ai represent the
individual coupling constraints. Let us also define λ = col(λ1, . . . , λN ) ∈ RNm
and similarly b of suitable dimensions. Then, the two operators A and B in (11)
can be rewritten as
A¯ :

 xz
λ

 7→

 F(x)0
Lλ + b

+

 0 0 A⊤0 0 L
−A −L 0



 xz
λ


B¯ :

 xz
λ

 7→

 G(x)0
NRm
≥0
(λ)

 .
(12)
From now on, we indicate the state variable as ω = col(x, z,λ). The prop-
erties of the operators in (12) depends on the properties of F and are described
in the next section. We here show that the zeros of A¯+ B¯ are the same as the
zeros of T in (10).
Lemma 1. Let Assumptions 1-4 hold and consider the operators A and B in
(11), and the operators A¯ and B¯ in (12). Then the following statements hold.
(i) Given any ω∗ ∈ zer(A¯ + B¯), x∗ is a v-SGNE of game in (4), i.e., x∗
solves the VI(X ,F) in (7). Moreover λ∗ = 1N ⊗ λ∗, and (x∗, λ∗) satisfy
the KKT condition in (9) i.e., col(x∗, λ∗) ∈ zer(A+ B).
(ii) zer(A+ B) 6= ∅ and zer(A¯+ B¯) 6= ∅.
Proof. See Appendix A.
From now on, we call Z = X × RmN × RmN≥0 and Z∗ the set of v-SGNE,
i.e., Z∗ = zer(A¯+ B¯).
Since the distribution of the random variable is unknown, the expected value
mapping can be hard to compute. Therefore, we take an approximation of
the pseudo-gradient mapping. At this stage, it is not important if we use the
stochastic approximation scheme or the sample average approximation scheme,
therefore, in what follows, we replace A¯ with
Aˆ :

 (x, ξ)z
λ

7→

 Fˆ (x, ξ)0
Lλ + b

+

 0 0 A⊤0 0 L
−A −L 0



 xz
λ

 . (13)
where Fˆ is an approximation of the expected value mapping F in (5) given some
realizations of the random vector ξ.
Then, Algorithm 1 can be written in compact form as [26]
ω¯k = (1− δ)ωk + δω¯k−1
ωk+1 = (Id+Φ−1B¯)−1(ω¯k − Φ−1Aˆ(ωk)).
(14)
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where Φ ≻ 0 contains the inverse of step size sequences
Φ = diag(α−1, ν−1, σ−1), (15)
and α−1, ν−1, σ−1 are diagonal matrices.
4.1 Convergence analysis with SAA
Now, we study the convergence of the algorithm using the sample average ap-
proximation (SAA) scheme.
First, to ensure that A¯ and B¯ have the properties that we use for the con-
vergence result, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 5 (Monotonicity). F as in (5) is monotone and ℓF-Lipschitz con-
tinuous for some ℓF > 0. 
Then, the two operators A¯ and B¯ in (12) have the following properties.
Lemma 2. Let Assumptions 4 and 5 hold and let Φ ≻ 0. Then, the operators
A¯ and B¯ in (12) have the following properties.
1. A¯ is monotone and ℓA¯-Lipschitz continuous.
2. The operator B¯ is maximally monotone.
3. Φ−1A¯ is monotone and ℓΦ-Lipschitz continuous.
4. Φ−1B¯ is maximally monotone.
Proof. See Appendix A.
We now enter the details of the SAA scheme. We suppose that, at each
iteration, the agents have access to a pool of samples of the random variable
and are able to compute an approximation of F(x) of the form
Fˆ (x, ξ) = FSAA(x, ξ)
= col
(
1
Sk
Sk∑
t=1
∇x1J1(x, ξ(t)1 ), . . . ,
1
S
Sk∑
t=1
∇xNJN (x, ξ(t)N )
)
.
(16)
where ξ = col(ξ¯1, . . . , ξ¯n), for all i ∈ I, ξ¯i = col(ξ(1)i , . . . , ξ(Sk)i ) and ξ is an
i.i.d. sequence of random variables drawn from P. Approximations of the form
(16) are very common in Monte-Carlo simulation approaches, machine learning
and computational statistics [5]; they are easy to obtain in case we are able to
sample from the measure P.
In the SAA approach, typical assumptions are related to the choice of a
proper batch size sequence [5, 21].
Assumption 6 (Increasing batch size). The batch size sequence (Sk)k≥1 is such
that, for some c, k0, a > 0,
Sk ≥ c(k + k0)a+1. 
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Form Assumption 6, it follows that 1/Sk is summable, which is a standard
assumption in SAA schemes. This assumption is often used in combination with
the forthcoming variance reduction assumption to control the stochastic error
[5, 21]. For k ≥ 0, the approximation error is defined as
ǫk = FSAA(x
k, ξk)− F(xk).
Remark 3. Since there is no uncertainty in the constraints, we indicate with
εk = col(ǫk, 0, 0) the error on the extended operator, i.e.,
ASAA(ωk, ξk)−A(ωk) = εk.
ASAA is the operator Aˆ in (13) with approximation Fˆ = FSAA as in (16). 
In the stochastic framework, there are usually assumptions on the expected
value and variance of the stochastic error ǫk [21, 24, 22].
Let us define the filtration F = {Fk}, that is, a family of σ-algebras such
that F0 = σ (X0) and
Fk = σ (X0, ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξk) ∀k ≥ 1,
such that Fk ⊆ Fk+1 for all k ≥ 0.
Assumption 7 (Zero mean error). The stochastic error is such that, for all
k ≥ 0, a.s.,
E
[
ǫk|Fk
]
= 0. 
Assumption 8 (Bounded variance). For all x ∈ X and p ≥ 1, let
sp(x) = E
[
‖Fˆ (x, ξ)− F(x)‖p
] 1
p
,
then, there exist p ≥ 2, σ0 ≥ 0, and a measurable locally bounded function σ :
SOL(X ,F)→ R such that for all x ∈ X and all x∗ ∈ SOL(X ,F)
sp(x) ≤ σ (x∗) + σ0 ‖x− x∗‖ . 
Remark 4. In what follows, we consider a stronger inequality than Assumption
8, namely, for all x ∈ X and σ > 0
E
[∥∥∥Fˆ (x, ξ)− F(x)∥∥∥2] ≤ σ2, (17)
to simplify the exposition. In the literature, Equation (17) is known as uni-
form bounded variance. This assumption is reasonable in our game theoretic
framework since we have a bounded feasible set while Assumption 8 is more
appropriate for unbounded domains. We also remark that all the following re-
sults, proved under Equation (17), hold also in the more general case given by
Assumption 8 and using the Lp norm for any p ≥ 2. We refer to [5, 21] for a
more detailed insight on this general case. 
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Lastly, we postulate some assumptions on the parameters involved.
Assumption 9 (Averaging parameter). The averaging parameter δ in (14) is
such that
1
ϕ
≤ δ ≤ 1
where ϕ = 1+
√
5
2 is the golden ratio. 
Assumption 10 (Step size bound). The steps size is such that
0 ≤ ∥∥Φ−1∥∥ ≤ 1
2δ(2ℓA¯ + 1)
where ℓA¯ is the Lipschitz constant of A¯ as in Lemma 2. 
We are now ready to state our convergence result.
Theorem 1. Let Assumptions 1-10 hold. Then, the sequence (xk)k∈N generated
by Algorithm 1 with Fˆ = FSAA as in (16) converges to a v-SGNE of the game
in (4).
Proof. See Appendix C.
In the following, we consider the case where the local non-smooth cost is
determined by the local constraints, i.e., gi(xi) = ιΩi(xi). Then, the problem is
slightly different and the algorithm converges under a weaker assumption than
monotonicity.
The first difference is that the operator B¯ is now given by
B¯ :

 xz
λ

 7→

 NΩ(x)0
NRm
≥0
(λ)

 ,
hence, we can have the projection instead of the proximal operator. Therefore,
the algorithm in compact form reads as
ω¯k = (1 − δ)ωk + δω¯k−1
ωk+1 = proj
Z′
(
ω¯k − Φ−1Aˆ(ωk)
)
.
(18)
where Z ′ = Ω×RmN ×RmN≥0 . To show convergence, let the mapping A¯ satisfy
the following assumption.
Assumption 11 (Almost restricted pseudo monotonicity). The operator A¯ is
such that for all ω ∈ Z and ω∗ ∈ Z∗
〈A¯(ω),ω − ω∗〉 ≥ 0. (19)

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Remark 5. The property in (19) is implied by both monotonicity and pseu-
domonotonicity but it does not necessarily hold for A¯ if we assume it directly
on F. It corresponds to the concept of weak solution of a VI, compared to that
of strong solution as in (7) [10]. It is also used in [5, 35] and an example of a
mapping that satisfy (19) can be found in [10, Equation 2.4]. 
We can now state the convergence result.
Corollary 1. Let Assumptions 1-11 hold. Then, the sequence generated by the
algorithm in (14) with Aˆ = ASAA as in Remark 3 converges to a SGNE of the
game in (4).
Proof. See Appendix C.
Remark 6. Using a SA scheme is not possible in this case because a vanishing
step size sequence should be taken to control the stochastic error. Having a time
varying step size sequence implies using a variable metric, induced by Φk =
diag(α−1k , σ
−1
k , ν
−1
k ), for the convergence analysis. Although using a variable
metric is doable, the matrix Φk should satisfy some assumptions that do not
hold if the step size sequence is diminishing [6]. 
5 Convergence under cocoercivity
Having a weak monotonicity condition on the pseudo-gradient implies taking a
small, although constant, step size sequence. However, if the pseudo-gradient
mapping satisfies a stronger monotonicity assumption, a larger step size can be
chosen. We discuss this case next.
The stronger assumption is to satisfy the cut property (described in details
in Remark 8 later on), that follows from cocoercivity. For this reason, we make
the following assumption on the pseudo-gradient mapping.
Assumption 12 (Cocoercivity). F in (5) is β-cocoercive for some β > 0. 
The operator splitting that we used in Section 4 is not cocoercive, even when
the mapping F is. For this reason, we here propose the following
C¯ :

 xz
λ

 7→

 F(x)0
b

+

 00
Lλ


D¯ :

 xz
λ

 7→

 NΩ(x)0
NRm
≥0
(λ)

+

 0 0 A⊤0 0 L
−A −L 0



 xz
λ

 .
(20)
Lemma 1 guarantees that a zero of C¯ + D¯ exists. Moreover, C¯ and D¯ in (20)
have the following properties.
Lemma 3. Let Assumption 12 hold and let Φ ≻ 0. The operators C¯ and D¯ in
(20) have the following properties:
13
(i) C¯ is θ-cocoercive where 0 < θ ≤ min { 12d∗ , β} and d∗ is the maximum
weighted degree of Gλ;
(ii) The operator D¯ is maximally monotone;
(iii) Φ−1C¯ is θγ-cocoercive where γ = 1|Φ−1| ;
(iv) Φ−1D¯ is maximally monotone.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Also in this case, we use an approximation to compute the expected value,
therefore, similarly to (13),
Cˆ :

 (x, ξ)z
λ

 7→

 Fˆ (x, ξ)0
Lλ + b

 . (21)
In this case, the SRFB algorithm is given by
ω¯k = (1− δ)ωk + δω¯k−1
ωk+1 = (Id+Ψ−1D¯)−1(ω¯k −Ψ−1Cˆ(ωk))
(22)
where the preconditioning matrix Ψ is defined as
Ψ =

 α−1 0 −A⊤0 ν−1 −L
−A −L σ−1

 , (23)
with α−1, ν−1, σ−1 defined as in (15) and A and L are, respectively, the ex-
tended constraints and Laplacian matrix.
The distributed SRFB steps reads as in Algorithm 2. We notice that Algo-
rithm 2 differs from Algorithm 1 in the computation of the dual variable λk+1
which, in this case, depends also on the variables xk+1 and zk+1.
5.1 Convergence analysis with SAA
Since the matrix Ψ must be positive definite [4], we postulate the following
assumption.
Assumption 13 (Step size sequence). The step size sequence is such that, given
γ > 0, for every agent i ∈ I
0 < αi ≤
(
γ + max
j∈{1,...,ni}
∑m
k=1
|[A⊤i ]jk|
)−1
0 < νi ≤ (γ + 2di)−1
0 < σi ≤
(
γ + 2di + max
j∈{1,...,m}
∑ni
k=1
|[Ai]jk|
)−1
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Algorithm 2 Stochastic Relaxed Preconditioned Forward Backward (SRpFB)
Initialization: x0i ∈ Ωi, λ0i ∈ Rm≥0, and z0i ∈ Rm. Iteration k: Agent i
(1): Updates the variables
x¯ki = (1 − δ)xki + δx¯k−1i
z¯ki = (1 − δ)zki + δz¯k−1i
λ¯ki = (1 − δ)λki + δλ¯k−1i
(2): Receives xkj for all j ∈ N Ji , λkj for j ∈ N λi then updates:
xk+1i = projΩi [x¯
k
i − αi(Fˆi(xki ,xk−i, ξki )−A⊤i λki )]
zk+1i = z¯
k
i − νi
∑
j∈Nλi
wi,j(λ
k
i − λkj )
(3): Receives zj,k+1 for all j ∈ N λi then updates:
λk+1i = projRm+
[
λ¯ki + σi
(
Ai(2x
k+1
i − xki )− bi
)
+ σi
∑
j∈Nλi
wi,j
(
2(zk+1i − zk+1j )− (zki − zkj )
)
− σi
∑
j∈Nλi
wi,j(λ
k
i − λkj )
]
where [A⊤i ]jk indicates the entry (j, k) of the matrix A
⊤
i . Moreover,∥∥Ψ−1∥∥ ≤ 1
δ(2ℓC¯ − 1)
where δ is the averaging parameter and ℓC¯ is the Lipschitz constant of C¯. 
We are now ready to state the convergence result.
Theorem 2. Let Assumptions 1-4, 6-9, 12, 13 hold. Then the sequence (xk)k∈N
generated by Algorithm 2 with Fˆ = FSAA as in (16) converges to a v-SGNE of
the game in (4).
Proof. See Appendix D.
6 Stochastic Nash equilibrium problems
In this section we consider a non-generalized SNEP, namely, a SGNEP without
shared constraints.
We consider that the local cost function of agent i is defined as in (3) with
gi(xi) = ιΩi (xi). Assumptions 1-3 holds also in this case.
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The aim of each agent i, given the decision variables of the other agents x−i,
is to choose a strategy xi, that solves its local optimization problem, i.e.,
∀i ∈ I : min
xi∈Ωi
Ji (xi,x−i) . (24)
As a solution, we aim to compute a stochastic Nash equilibrium (SNE), that is,
a collective strategy x∗ ∈ Ω such that for all i ∈ I
Ji(x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i) ≤ inf{Ji(y,x∗−i) | y ∈ Ωi)}.
We note that, compared to Definition 2, here we consider only local constraints.
Also in this case, we study the associated stochastic variational inequality
(SVI) given by
〈F(x∗),x− x∗〉 ≥ 0 for all x ∈ Ω (25)
where F is defined as in (5). The stochastic variational equilibrium (v-SNE) of
the game in (24) is defined as the solution of the SVI(Ω,F) in (25).
Remark 7. A collective strategy x∗ ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium of the game in
(24) if and only if x∗ is a solution of the SVI in (25) [14, Proposition 1.4.2],
[31, Lemma 3.3]. 
The SRFB iterations for SNEPs are shown in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Stochastic Relaxed Forward Backward
Initialization: x0i ∈ Ωi
Iteration k: Agent i receives xkj for all j ∈ N Ji , then updates:
x¯ki = (1− δ)xki + δx¯k−1i
xk+1i = projΩi [x¯
k
i − αiFˆi(xki ,xk−i, ξki )]
6.1 Convergence analysis with SA
If one has a limited number of samples, the so-called stochastic approximation
(SA) scheme should be used. Specifically, in this case we sample only one
realisation of the random variable, that is,
Fˆ (xk, ξk) = FSA(x
k, ξk)
= col(∇x1J1(xk, ξk1 ), . . . ,∇xNJN (xk, ξkN )),
(26)
where ξk = col(ξk1 , . . . , ξ
k
N ) ∈ RN is a collection of i.i.d. random variables drawn
from P.
Taking fewer samples is less computationally expensive but we have to make
some further assumptions on the pseudo-gradient mapping.
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Assumption 14 (Cut property). F in (5) is such that:
x∗ ∈ SOL(F,Ω)
x¯ ∈ C
x¯ 6= x∗
〈F(x¯), x¯− x∗〉 = 0

 =⇒ x¯ ∈ SOL(F,Ω) (27)

Remark 8. The cut property means that, given a solution x∗, it can be verified
if another point x¯ is also a solution by looking only at x¯ and x∗ instead of
comparing x¯ with all the points in X . A very intuitive example is the search for
a minimum of a single-valued function [20].
The class of mappings that satisfy this assumption is that of paramonotone
(or monotone+) operators. A paramonotone operator is a monotone operator
such that for all x,y ∈ X
〈F(x)− F(y),x− y〉 = 0⇒ F(x) = F(y).
This property does not hold in general for monotone operators. It holds for
strongly and strictly monotone operators, because in this cases there is only
one solution [14, Theorem 2.3.3], and for cocoercive operators. Indeed, strict
monotonicity implies paramonotonicity that in turn implies monotonicity [20,
Definition 2.1]. The same holds for cocoercive operators that are also paramono-
tone and consequently monotone [14, Definition 2.3.9]. We refer to [20, 7] for
a deeper insight on this class of operators. 
Assumption 15 (Bounded pseudo-gradient). F is bounded, i.e., there exists
B > 0 such that for all x ∈ X
‖F(x)‖2 ≤ B. 
Even if this assumption is quite strong, it is reasonable in our game theoretic
framework. On the other hand, we do not require F to be Lipschitz continuous,
which is practical since computing the Lipschitz constant is in general difficult.
With a little abuse of notation, we denote the approximation error again
with
ǫk = FSA(x
k, ξk)− F(xk).
Concerning the assumptions on the stochastic error, we still suppose that it
has zero expected value (Assumption 7) but we do not need an explicit bound
on the variance.
Assumption 16 (Parameter and step sizes). The averaging parameter is such
that δ ∈ (0, 1). The step size is square summable and such that
∞∑
k=0
γk =∞,
∞∑
k=0
γ2k <∞ and
∞∑
k=0
γ2k E
[
‖ǫk‖2 |Fk
]
<∞.

We now state the main convergence result of this section.
17
Theorem 3. Let Assumptions 1-4, 7, 11, 14-16 hold. Then, the sequence
(xk)k∈N generated by Algorithm 3 with Fˆ = FSA as in (26) converges to a
solution of the game in (24).
Proof. See Appendix E.
Remark 9. We note that Theorem 3 holds also in the deterministic case, under
the same assumptions with the exception of those on the stochastic error (that is
not present in this case). Formally, under Assumptions 1-4, 14-16, Algorithm 3
converges to a v-NE of the game in (24). Moreover, one can use [26, Algorithm
1] to find a deterministic NE. 
6.2 Discussion on further monotonicity assumptions
In this section we discuss some consequences of Theorems 1 and 3. In particular,
we discuss different monotonicity notions that can be used to find a SNE in
relation with the two possible approximation schemes.
First of all, Algorithm 1 with SAA scheme can be used also for SNEPs.
Corollary 2. If Assumptions 1-3, 5-10 hold. Then Algorithm 1 with Fˆ = FSAA
as in (16) converges to a v-SNE of the game in (24).
Proof. Set A = 0 and b = 0 and apply Theorem 1.
Remark 10. Also in this case, the condition presented in Remark 5 can be used
instead of monotonicity. 
The same result holds in the case of cocoercive mappings but in this case
Assumption 12 can be reduced to the cut property.
Corollary 3. Let Assumptions 1-3, 6-9, 12, 13 hold. Then, the sequence
{xk}k∈N generated by Algorithm 2 with Fˆ = FSAA as in (16) converges to a
v-SNE fo the game in (24).
Proof. Set A = 0 and b = 0 and apply Theorem 2.
Concerning the SA scheme, there are other assumptions that can be consid-
ered.
Assumption 17 (Acute angle relation). F as in (5) satisfies the acute angle
relation, i.e., for all x ∈ X and x∗ ∈ SOL(F,Ω)
〈F(x),x− x∗〉 > 0.

Remark 11. The acute angle relation is implied by strict pseudomonotonicity
which is in turn implied by strict monotonicity [22, Definition 2]. It is stronger
than the assumption in Remark 5 since the condition is satisfied with the strict
inequality. 
Corollary 4. If Assumptions 1-3, 7, 16, 17 hold. Then, the sequence {xk}k∈N
generated by Algorithm 3 with Fˆ = FSA as in (26) converges to a v-SNE of the
game in (24).
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Proof. See Appendix F.
Finally, let us consider the so-called weak sharpness property.
Assumption 18 (Weak sharpness). F satisfies the weak sharpness property,
i.e. for all x ∈ X , x∗ ∈ SOL(F,Ω) and for some c > 0
〈F(x∗),x− x∗〉 ≥ c min
x
∗∈SOL(F,Ω)
‖x− x∗‖

Remark 12. Assumption 18 is stronger than that in Remark 5 and it is often
used in addition to monotonicity [22, 9]. It is sometimes considered a property
of the solution set and it is implied by paramonotonicity [27, Theorem 4.1]. 
Corollary 5. Let Assumptions 1-3, 7, 16, 18 hold. Then, the sequence {xk}k∈N
generated by Algorithm 3 converges to a v-SNE of the game in (24).
Proof. See Appendix F.
7 Comparative numerical simulations
Let us now propose some numerical simulations to corroborate the theoretical
analysis. We compare our algorithm with the stochastic distributed precondi-
tioned forward–backward (SpFB) [34, 15], forward–backward–forward (SFBF)
[16, 5], extragradient (SEG) [21] and projected reflected gradient (SPRG) [9, 8]
algorithms, using the SAA scheme.
We present two sets of simulations: a Cournot game and an academic ex-
ample. While the first is a realistic application to an electricity market with
market capacity constraints, the second is built to show the advantages of the
SRFB algorithm. All the simulations are performed on Matlab R2019a with a
2,3 GHz Intel Core i5 and 8 GB LPDDR3 RAM.
7.1 Illustrative example
We start with the built up example, that is, a monotone (non-cocoercive)
stochastic Nash equilibrium problem with two players with strategies x1 and
x2 respectively, and pseudo-gradient mapping
F(x) =
[
0 R1(ξ)
−R2(ξ) 0
] [
x1
x2
]
.
The mapping is monotone and the random variables are sampled from a normal
distribution with mean 1 and finite variance. The problem is unconstrained and
the optimal solution is (0, 0). The step sizes are taken to be the highest possible.
As one can see from Figure 1, the SpFB does not converge in this case because
stronger monotonicity properties on the mapping should be taken. Moreover,
we note that the SPRG is not guaranteed to converge under mere monotonic-
ity. From Figure 2 instead, we note that the SRFB algorithm requires fewer
communications than the EG and guarantee convergence.
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Figure 1: Distance of the primal variable from the solution.
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Figure 2: Distance of the primal variable from the solution versus number of
pseudo-gradient evaluations.
7.2 Case study: Network Cournot game
We consider the network Cournot game proposed in [26, 28] with the addition
of markets capacity constraints [38, 41].
Let us consider a set of N companies that sell a commodity in a set of m
markets. Each company decides the quantity xi of product to be delivered in the
ni markets it is connected with. Each company has a local cost function ci(xi)
related to the production of the commodity. We assume that the cost function
is not uncertain as the companies should know their own cost of production.
Since the markets have a bounded capacity b = [b1, . . . , bm], the collective con-
straints are given by Ax ≤ b where A = [A1, . . . , AN ]. Each Ai indicates in
which markets each company participates. The prices are collected in a map-
ping P : Rm × Ξ → R that denotes the inverse demand curve. The random
variable ξ ∈ Ξ represents the demand uncertainty. The cost function of each
agent is therefore given by
Ji(xi, x−i, ξ) = ci(xi)− E
[
P (x, ξ)
∑
i∈I xi
]
. (28)
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7.3 Simulations
As a numerical setting, we consider a set of 20 companies and 7 markets, con-
nected as in [38, Fig. 1]. Following [38], we suppose that the dual variables
graph is a cycle graph with the addition of the edges (2, 15) and (6, 13). Each
company i has local constraints of the form 0 < xi ≤ θi where each component
of θi is randomly drawn from [1, 1.5]. The maximal capacity bj of a market j is
randomly drawn from [0.5, 1]. The local cost function of company i is
ci(xi) = q
⊤
i xi +
βi
βi+1
π
1
βi
i
∑ni
j=1([xi]j)
βi+1
βi
where [xi]j indicates the j component of xi. πi is randomly drawn from [0.5, 5],
and each component of qi is randomly drawn from [1, 100]. Similarly to [26, 28],
we assume that the inverse demand function is of the form
P (x, ξ) = Λ(ξ)
1
γ
(∑
i∈I xi
)− 1
γ
where γ = 1.1 and Λ(ξ) is drawn following a normal distribution with mean
5000 and finite variance. We note that the mapping in (28) is monotone but it
may be not Lipschitz continuous depending on β and γ.
We simulate the SpFB, SFBF, SEG and SRFB to make a comparison using
the SAA scheme. Since the mapping is not Lipschitz continuous, we tune the
step sizes to be one half of the minimum step that causes instability. The plots
in Fig. 3 and 4 show respectively the residual of xk (res(xk)) that measure the
distance from xk being a solution, and the distance from consensus of the mul-
tipliers (‖L⊗ I7 λk‖). The plot in Fig. 5 shows the number of communications
needed to reach a solution. As one can see from Fig. 3 and 5, our algorithm is
slower than the SpFB as ours involves the averaging step but it is faster than the
extragradient scheme. Remarkably, the fact that the mapping is only monotone
and not Lipschitz continuous prevent the SFBF from converging but it does not
affect the other algorithms.
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Figure 3: Residual distance of the primal variable from the solution.
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Figure 4: Disagreement between the dual variables.
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Figure 5: Residual distance of the primal variable from the solution versus
number of pseudo-gradient evaluations..
8 Conclusion
The stochastic relaxed forward–backward algorithm is applicable to stochastic
(generalized) Nash equilibrium seeking in merely monotone games. To approx-
imate the expected valued pseudo-gradient, the sample average approximation
scheme or the stochastic approximation scheme can be used to guarantee almost
sure convergence to an equilibrium.
Our stochastic relaxed forward–backward algorithm is the first distributed
algorithm with single proximal computation and single pseudo-gradient evalua-
tion per iteration for merely monotone stochastic games.
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A Properties of the extended operators
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof of (i) can be obtained similarly to [38, Theorem
2]. Concerning (ii), given Assumption 1-3, the game in (4) has at least one
solution x∗, therefore, there exists a λ∗ ∈ Rm≥0 such that the KKT conditions in
(9) are satisfied [2, Theorem 3.1]. It follows that zer(A+B) 6= ∅. The existance
of z∗ such that col(x∗, z∗,λ∗) ∈ zer(A¯+ B¯) follows using some properties of the
normal cone and of the Laplacian matrix as a consequence of Assumption 4 [38,
Theorem 2].
Proof of Lemma 2. A¯ = A1 +A2 is given by a sum, therefore it is monotone if
both the addend are [3, Proposition 20.10]. A2 is monotone because it is skew
symmetric [3, Corollary 20.28] and monotonicity of A1 follows from
〈A1(ω1)−A1(ω2),ω1 − ω2〉 = 〈F(x1)− F(x2),x1 − x2〉
+ 〈Lλ1 − Lλ2,λ1 − λ2〉 ≥ 0,
since Assumption 5 holds and L is cocoercive by the Baillon-Haddard Theorem
and, therefore, monotone [3, Example 20.5]. To show that A¯ is Lipschitz con-
tinuous, we use the fact that F is ℓF -Lipschitz and L is ℓL-Lipschitz continuous:∥∥A¯(ω1)− A¯(ω2)∥∥ ≤ ‖F(x1)− F(x2)‖+ ‖Lλ1 − Lλ2‖
≤ (ℓF + ℓL)(‖x1 − x2‖+ ‖λ1 − λ2‖ .
Similarly we can prove that the skew symmetric part is ℓA2-Lipschitz continuous
(with constant that depends on A and L) from which it follows that A¯ is ℓA¯ =
ℓA1 + ℓA2-Lipschitz continuous.
B¯ is maximally monotone by [3, Proposition 20.23] because G(x) is maximally
monotone by Assumption 2 and Moreau Theorem [3, Theorem 20.25] and the
Normal cone is maximally monotone [3, Example 20.26].
The fact that Φ−1A¯ is monotone follows from the fact that A¯ is monotone:
〈Φ−1(A¯(ω1)− Φ−1A¯(ω2),ω1 − ω2〉Φ =
= 〈A¯(ω1)− A¯(ω2),ω1 − ω2〉 ≥ 0.
Similarly it holds that Φ−1A¯ is Lipschitz continuous and that Φ−1B¯ is maximally
monotone.
Proof of Lemma 3. First we notice that ‖L‖ ≥ 2d∗ and that by the Baillon-
Haddard Theorem the Laplacian operator is 12d∗ -cocoercive. Then Statement
1) follow by this computation:
〈C¯(ω1)− C¯(ω2),ω1 − ω2〉
= 〈F(x1)− F(x2), x1 − x2〉+ 〈Lλ1 −Lλ2,λ1 − λ2〉
≥ β ‖F(x1)− F(x2)‖2 + 1
2d∗
‖Lλ1 −Lλ2‖2
≥ min
{
β,
1
2d∗
}(
‖F(x1)− F(x2)‖2 + ‖Lλ1 −Lλ2‖2
)
≥ θ ∥∥C¯(ω1)− C¯(ω2)∥∥2 .
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The operator D¯ is given by a sum, therefore it is maximally monotone if both
the addend are [3, Proposition 20.23]. The first part is maximally monotone
because the normal cone is and the second part is a skew symmetric matrix [3,
Corollary 20.28]. Statement 3) follows from Statement 1) and 4) follows from
2) [38, Lemma 7].
B Useful lemmas
We here recall some known facts about norms and sequence of random variables.
Moreover, we include two preliminary results that are useful for the forthcoming
convergence proofs.
Norm properties. Now we recall some property of the norms that we will
use in the proofs. We use the cosine rule (or Pythagorean identity)
〈x, y〉 = 1
2
(
〈x, x〉+ 〈y, y〉 − ‖x− y‖2
)
(29)
and the following two property of the norm [3, Corollary 2.15], ∀a, b ∈ X , ∀α ∈ R
‖αa+ (1− α)b‖2 = α‖a‖2 + (1− α)‖b‖2 − α(1 − α)‖a− b‖2, (30)
‖a+ b‖2 ≤ 2‖a‖2 + 2‖b‖2. (31)
Property of the projection and proximal operator. By [3, Proposition
12.26], the projection operator and the proximity operators satisfy, respectively,
the following inequalities. Let C be a nonempty closed convex set and let g be
a proper lower semicontinuous function, then, for all x, y ∈ C
x¯ = projC(x)⇔ 〈x¯− x, y − x¯〉 ≥ 0. (32)
x¯ = proxg(x)⇔ 〈x¯− x, y − x¯〉 ≥ g(x¯)− g(y) (33)
Moreover, by [3, Proposition 16.44], it holds that
proxg = (Id+∂g)
−1. (34)
Sequence of random variables. We now recall some results concerning se-
quences of random variables, given the probability space (Ξ,F ,P).
The Robbins-Siegmund Lemma is widely used in literature to prove a.s.
convergence of sequences of random variables. It first appeared in [33].
Lemma 4 (Robbins-Siegmund Lemma, [33]). Let F = (Fk)k∈N be a filtration.
Let {αk}k∈N, {θk}k∈N, {ηk}k∈N and {χk}k∈N be non negative sequences such
that
∑
k ηk <∞,
∑
k χk <∞ and let
∀k ∈ N, E[αk+1|Fk] + θk ≤ (1 + χk)αk + ηk a.s.
Then
∑
k θk < ∞ and {αk}k∈N converges a.s. to a non negative random vari-
able.
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We also need this result for Lp norms, known as Burkholder-Davis-Gundy
inequality [36].
Lemma 5 (Burkholder-Davis-Gundy inequality). Let {Fk} be a filtration and
{Uk}k≥0 a vector-valued martingale relative to this filtration. Then, for all
p ∈ [1,∞), there exists a universal constant cp > 0 such that for every k ≥ 1
E
[(
sup
0≤i≤N
‖Ui‖
)p] 1p
≤ cpE

( N∑
i=1
‖Ui − Ui−1‖2
) p
2


1
p
.
When combined with Minkowski inequality, we obtain for all p ≥ 2 a constant
Cp > 0 such that for every k ≥ 1
E
[(
sup
0≤i≤N
‖Ui‖
)p] 1p
≤ Cp
√√√√ N∑
k=1
E (‖Ui − Ui−1‖p)
2
p .
Preliminary results. Given Lemma 5, we prove a preliminary result on the
variance of the stochastic error.
Proposition 1. For all k ≥ 0, if Assumption 8 holds, we have
E
[
‖ǫk‖2 |Fk
]
≤ Cσ
2
Sk
. a.s..
Proof. We first prove that
E
[
‖ǫk‖2 |Fk
] 1
2 ≤ c2σ√
Sk
,
then the claim follows immediately. Define the process {MSS (x)}Si=0 asM0(x) =
0 and for 1 ≤ i ≤ S
MSi (x) =
1
S
i∑
j=1
FSAA(x, ξj)− F(x).
Let Fi = σ(ξ1, . . . , ξi). Then {MSi (x),Fi}Si=1 is a martingale starting at 0. Let
∆MSi−1(x) =M
S
i (x)−MSi−1(x)
= FSAA(x, ξi)− F(x).
Then, by Equation (17), we have
E
[∥∥∆MSi−1∥∥2] 12 = 1SE
[
‖FSAA(x, ξi)− F(x)‖2
] 1
2 ≤ σ
S
.
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By applying Lemma 5, we have
E
[∥∥MSS (x)∥∥2] 12 ≤ c2
√√√√ N∑
i=1
E
[∥∥∥∥FSAA(x, ξi)− F(x)S
∥∥∥∥
2
]
≤ c2
√√√√ 1
S2
N∑
i=1
E
[
‖FSAA(x, ξi)− F(x)‖2
]
≤ c2σ√
S
.
We note that MSS (x
k) = ǫk, hence by taking the square we conclude that
E
[
‖ǫk‖2 |Fk
]
≤ cσ
2
Sk
.
Remark 13. If Proposition 1 holds, then it follows that
E
[∥∥Φ−1εk∥∥2Φ |Fk
]
≤ cσ
2
∥∥Φ−1∥∥
Sk
.

In the next Lemma, we collect some inequalities that follows from the defi-
nition of the algorithm in (14).
Lemma 6. Let (ωk, ω¯k)k∈N be generated by Algorithm 1 defined as in (14).
Then, the following equations hold:
(i) ωk − ω¯k−1 = 1
δ
(ωk − ω¯k);
(ii) ωk+1 − ω∗ = 11−δ (ω¯k+1 − ω∗)− δ1−δ (ω¯k − ω∗);
(iii) δ(1−δ)2
∥∥ω¯k+1 − ωk∥∥2 = δ ∥∥ωk+1 − ωk∥∥2.
Proof. Straightforward from (14).
C Proofs of Section 4.1
The proof uses the Φ-induced norm and inner product.
Proof of Theorem 1. First, let us define
H(x,λ) =
∑
i∈I
gi(xi) + ιR≥0(λi)
and note that
Φ−1B¯ = α∂
[∑
i∈I
gi(xi) + ιR≥0(λi)
]
= α∂H.
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By (34), (Id+Φ−1B¯)−1 = (Id+α∂H)−1 = proxαH . Therefore, by using the
property of proximal operators in (33), we have that
〈ωk+1 − ω¯k +Φ−1Aˆ(ωk, ξk),ω∗ − ωk+1〉 ≥ α(H(ωk+1)−H(ω∗)) (35)
〈ωk − ω¯k−1 +Φ−1Aˆ(ωk−1, ξk−1),ωk+1 − ωk〉 ≥ α(H(ωk)−H(ωk+1)).
(36)
By using Lemma 6(i), (36) becomes
〈1
δ
(ωk − ω¯k) + Φ−1Aˆ(ωk−1, ξk−1),ωk+1 − ωk〉 ≥ α(H(ωk)−H(ωk+1)).
(37)
Then, by adding (35) and (37) we obtain
〈ωk+1 − ω¯k +Φ−1Aˆ(ωk, ξk),ω∗ − ωk+1〉+
+ 〈1
δ
(ωk − ω¯k) + Φ−1Aˆ(ωk−1, ξk−1),ωk+1 − ωk〉 ≥
≥ α(H(ωk)−H(ω∗)).
(38)
Now, we use the cosine rule (29):
〈ωk+1 − ω¯k,ω∗ − ωk+1〉 = −1
2
(∥∥ωk+1 − ω¯k∥∥2 + ∥∥ωk+1 − ω∗∥∥2 − ∥∥ω∗ − ω¯k∥∥2)
〈1
δ
(ωk − ω¯k),ωk+1 − ωk〉 = − 1
2δ
(∥∥ωk − ω¯k∥∥2 + ∥∥ωk − ωk+1∥∥2 − ∥∥ωk+1 − ω¯k∥∥2)
and we note that
〈Φ−1Aˆ(ωk, ξk),ω∗ − ωk+1〉 = −〈Φ−1A¯(ωk),ωk − ω∗〉+ 〈εk,ω∗ − ωk〉+
+ 〈Φ−1A¯(ωk),ωk − ωk+1〉+ 〈εk,ωk − ωk+1〉.
Then, by reordering and substituting in (38), we obtain
−∥∥ωk+1 − ω¯k∥∥2 − ∥∥ωk+1 − ω∗∥∥2 + ∥∥ω∗ − ω¯k∥∥2+
−1
δ
∥∥ωk − ω¯k∥∥2 − 1
δ
∥∥ωk − ωk+1∥∥2 + 1
δ
∥∥ωk+1 − ω¯k∥∥2+
−2〈Φ−1A¯(ωk),ωk − ω∗〉+ 2〈Φ−1εk,ω∗ − ωk〉+
+2〈Φ−1(A¯(ωk)− A¯(ωk−1)),ωk − ωk+1〉+
+2〈Φ−1(εk − εk−1),ωk − ωk+1〉 ≥ α(H(ωk)−H(ω∗)).
(39)
Since A¯ is monotone, it holds that
〈Φ−1A¯(ωk),ωk − ω∗〉+ α(H(ωk)−H(ω∗)) ≥
≥ 〈Φ−1A¯(ω∗),ωk − ω∗〉+ α(H(ωk)−H(ω∗)) ≥ 0. (40)
Now we apply Lemma 6(ii) and Lemma 6(iii) to
∥∥ωk+1 − ω∗∥∥:
∥∥ωk+1 − ω∗∥∥2 = 1
1− δ
∥∥ω¯k+1 − ω∗∥∥2 − δ
1− δ
∥∥ω¯k − ω∗∥∥2 + δ ∥∥ωk+1 − ωk∥∥2 .
(41)
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By substituting in (39), grouping and reordering, we have
1
1− δ
∥∥ω¯k+1 − ω∗∥∥2 + 1
δ
∥∥ωk − ωk+1∥∥2 ≤
≤
(
δ
1− δ + 1
)∥∥ω∗ − ω¯k∥∥2 − 1
δ
∥∥ωk − ω¯k∥∥2+
+ 2〈Φ−1(A¯(ωk)− A¯(ωk−1)),ωk − ωk+1〉
+ 2〈Φ−1εk,ω∗ − ωk〉+ 2〈Φ−1(εk − εk−1),ωk − ωk+1〉
(42)
where we used Assumption 9. Moreover, by using Lipschitz continuity of F and
Cauchy-Schwartz and Young’s inequality, we obtain that
〈Φ−1(A¯(ωk)− A¯(ωk−1)),ωk − ωk+1〉 ≤
≤ ℓA¯
∥∥Φ−1∥∥
2
(∥∥ωk − ωk−1∥∥2 + ∥∥ωk − ωk+1∥∥2) .
Similarly, we can bound the term involving the stochastic errors
2〈Φ−1(εk − εk−1),ωk − ωk+1〉 ≤ 2 ∥∥Φ−1∥∥ ∥∥εk − εk−1∥∥ ∥∥ωk − ωk+1∥∥
≤ ∥∥Φ−1∥∥ ∥∥εk − εk−1∥∥2 + ∥∥Φ−1∥∥ ∥∥ωk − ωk+1∥∥2 .
Substituting in (42), it yelds
1
1− δ
∥∥ω¯k+1 − ω∗∥∥2 + 1
δ
∥∥ωk − ωk+1∥∥2 ≤
≤ 1
1− δ
∥∥ω∗ − ω¯k∥∥2 − 1
δ
∥∥ωk − ω¯k∥∥2+
+ ℓA¯
∥∥Φ−1∥∥(∥∥ωk − ωk−1∥∥2 + ∥∥ωk − ωk+1∥∥2)+
+
∥∥Φ−1∥∥ ∥∥εk − εk−1∥∥2 + ∥∥Φ−1∥∥ ∥∥ωk − ωk+1∥∥2
+ 2〈Φ−1εk,ω∗ − ωk〉
(43)
Now consider the residual function of ωk:
res(ωk)2 =
∥∥ωk − (Id+Φ−1B¯)−1(ωk − Φ−1A¯(ωk)∥∥2
≤ 2 ∥∥ωk − ωk+1∥∥2 + 2 ∥∥ω¯k − ωk +Φ−1εk∥∥2
≤ 2 ∥∥ωk − ωk+1∥∥2 + 4 ‖ω¯k − ωk‖2 + ∥∥Φ−1εk∥∥2
where we added and subtracted ωk+1 = proj(ω¯k − Φ−1Aˆ(ωk) in the first in-
equality and used the firmly non expansiveness of the projection and (31). It
follows that
‖ω¯k − ωk‖2 ≥ 1
4
res(ωk)2 − 1
2
∥∥ωk − ωk+1∥∥2 − 4 ∥∥Φ−1εk∥∥2
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Substituting in (43)
1
1− δ
∥∥ω¯k+1 − ω∗∥∥2 + 1
δ
∥∥ωk − ωk+1∥∥2 ≤ 1
1− δ
∥∥ω∗ − ω¯k∥∥2
− 1
δ
(
1
4
res(ωk)2 − 1
2
∥∥ωk − ωk+1∥∥2 − ∥∥Φ−1εk∥∥2
)
+ ℓA¯
∥∥Φ−1∥∥(∥∥ωk − ωk−1∥∥2 + ∥∥ωk − ωk+1∥∥2)
+
∥∥Φ−1∥∥ ∥∥εk − εk−1∥∥2 + ∥∥Φ−1∥∥ ∥∥ωk − ωk+1∥∥2
+ 2〈Φ−1εk,ω∗ − ωk〉
Taking the expected value, grouping and using Proposition 1 and Assumptions
7 and 10, we have
E
[
1
1− δ
∥∥ω¯k+1 − ω∗∥∥2 |Fk
]
+
+E
[(
1
2δ
− ℓA¯
∥∥Φ−1∥∥− ∥∥Φ−1∥∥)∥∥ωk − ωk+1∥∥2 |Fk
]
≤
≤ 1
1− δ
∥∥ω∗ − ω¯k∥∥2 + ℓA¯ ∥∥Φ−1∥∥ ∥∥ωk − ωk−1∥∥2+
+
2
∥∥Φ−1∥∥Cσ
Sk
+
2
∥∥Φ−1∥∥Cσ
Sk−1
+
∥∥Φ−1∥∥
δ
Cσ
Sk
− 1
δ
∥∥ωk − ω¯k∥∥2 − 1
4δ
res(ωk)2
To use Lemma 4, let
αk =
1
1− δ
∥∥ω∗ − ω¯k∥∥2 + ℓA¯ ∥∥Φ−1∥∥ ∥∥ωk − ωk−1∥∥2 ,
θk =
1
δ
∥∥ωk − ω¯k∥∥2 + 1
4δ
res(ωk)2
ηk =
2
∥∥Φ−1∥∥Cσ
Sk
+
2
∥∥Φ−1∥∥Cσ
Sk−1
+
∥∥Φ−1∥∥
δ
Cσ
Sk
.
Applying the Robbins Siegmund Lemma we conclude that αk converges and
that
∑
k θk is summable. This implies that the sequence {ω¯k} is bounded and
that ‖ωk − ω¯k‖ → 0 (othewise ∑ 1
δ
‖ωk − ω¯k‖2 = ∞). Therefore {ωk} has
at least one cluster point ω˜. Moreover, since
∑
θk < ∞, res(ωk)2 → 0 and
res(ω˜k)2 = 0.
Proof of Corollary 1. The proof is similar to Theorem 1 but we do not use
monotonicity. Therefore, the steps are the same, with the exception of (40).
Indeed, the terms in H are not present since the projection satisfies (32), and
〈A¯(ωk),ωk − ω∗〉 ≥ 0 by Assumption 11. Then, the conclusion follows as in
Theorem 1.
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D Proof of Theorem 2
Proof of Theorem 2. The first part of the proof is the same as Theorem 1 since
the resolvent is firmly non expansive but we do not use the residual nor mono-
tonicity. Then, taking the expected value and grouping in (43), we have
E
[
1
1− δ
∥∥ω¯k+1 − ω∗∥∥2 |Fk
]
+
+ E
[(
1
δ
− ℓC¯
∥∥Φ−1∥∥− ∥∥Φ−1∥∥)∥∥ωk − ωk+1∥∥2 |Fk
]
≤
≤ 1
1− δ
∥∥ω∗ − ω¯k∥∥2 + ℓC¯ ∥∥Φ−1∥∥ ∥∥ωk − ωk−1∥∥2 − 1δ
∥∥ωk − ω¯k∥∥2+
− 2〈Φ−1C¯(ωk),ωk − ω∗〉+ 2
∥∥Φ−1∥∥Cσ
Sk
+
2
∥∥Φ−1∥∥Cσ
Sk−1
.
where the inequality follows by Proposition 1 and Assumptions 7 and 13.
To use Lemma 4, let
αk =
1
1− δ
∥∥ω∗ − ω¯k∥∥2 + ℓC¯ ∥∥Φ−1∥∥ ∥∥ωk − ωk−1∥∥2 ,
θk =
1
δ
∥∥ωk − ω¯k∥∥2 + 2〈Φ−1C¯(ωk),ωk − ω∗〉,
ηk = 2
∥∥Φ−1∥∥Cσ2( 1
Sk
+
1
Sk−1
)
.
Then we conclude that αk converges and θk is summable. This implies that {ω¯k}
is bounded and that ‖ωk − ω¯k‖ → 0. Therefore {ωk} has at least one cluster
point ω˜. Moreover, 〈Φ−1C¯(ωk),ωk −ω∗〉 → 0 and 〈C¯(ω˜), ω˜ −ω∗〉 = 0. Since C¯
is cocoercive, it also satisfy the cut property, therefore ω˜ is a solution.
E Proof of Theorem 3
Proof of Theorem 3. We start by using the fact that the projection is firmly
quasinonexpansive.
∥∥xk+1 − x∗∥∥2 ≤∥∥∥x∗ − x¯k + λkFˆ (xk, ξk)∥∥∥2 − ∥∥∥x¯k − λkFˆ (xk, ξk)− xk+1∥∥∥2
≤∥∥x− x¯k∥∥2 − ∥∥x¯k − xk+1∥∥2 + 2λk〈Fˆ (xk, ξk),x∗ − x¯k〉
+ 2λk〈Fˆ (xk, ξk), x¯k − xk+1〉
=
∥∥x∗ − x¯k∥∥2 − ∥∥x¯k − xk+1∥∥2 + 2λk〈Fˆ (xk, ξk), x¯k − xk+1〉
+ 2λk〈Fˆ (xk, ξk),x∗ − xk〉+ 2λk〈Fˆ (xk, ξk),xk − x¯k〉
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Using Lemma 6.2 and 6.3 as in (41), we can rewrite the inequality as
1
1− δ
∥∥x¯k+1 − x∗∥∥2 ≤ 1
1− δ
∥∥x¯k − x∗∥∥2
+ 2λk〈Fˆ (xk, ξk),x∗ − xk〉+ 2λk〈Fˆ (xk, ξk),xk − x¯k〉
+ 2λk〈Fˆ (xk, ξk), x¯k − xk+1〉 − (δ + 1)
∥∥xk+1 − x¯k∥∥2
(44)
Applying the Young’s inequality to the inner products we obtain
2λk〈Fˆ (xk, ξk),xk − x¯k〉 ≤ λ2k
∥∥∥Fˆ (xk, ξk)∥∥∥2 + ∥∥xk − x¯k∥∥2
2λk〈Fˆ (xk, ξk), x¯k − xk+1〉 ≤ λ2k
∥∥∥Fˆ (xk, ξk)∥∥∥2 + ∥∥x¯k − xk+1∥∥2
Then (44) becomes
1
1− δ
∥∥x¯k+1 − x∗∥∥2 ≤ 1
1− δ
∥∥x¯k − x∗∥∥2
+ 2λk〈F(xk),x∗ − xk〉+ 2λk〈ǫk,x∗ − xk〉
+ 4λ2k
∥∥F(xk)∥∥2 + 4λ2k ∥∥ǫk∥∥2 − (δ + 1)∥∥xk+1 − x¯k∥∥2
+
∥∥xk − x¯k∥∥2 + ∥∥x¯k − xk+1∥∥2
(45)
Using Lemma 6.1 and Assumption 7, reordering and taking the expected value
E
[
1
1− δ
∥∥x¯k+1 − x∗∥∥2 |Fk
]
+ E
[
δ
∥∥xk+1 − x¯k∥∥2 |Fk] ≤
≤ 1
1− δ
∥∥x¯k − x∗∥∥2 + δ2 ∥∥xk − x¯k−1∥∥2
+ 2λk〈F(xk),x∗ − xk〉+ 4λ2k
∥∥F(xk)∥∥2 + 4λ2kE [∥∥ǫk∥∥2 |Fk]
(46)
Applying Lemma 4, we deduce that {x¯k} and {xk}k∈N are bounded sequence
and that they have a cluster point, that is, x¯k → x¯ and xk → x. Since x¯k =
(1 − δ)xk + δx¯k−1, taking the limit, we obtain that x¯ = x. Moreover, since
〈F(xk),x∗ − xk〉 ≤ 0, again by Lemma 4, we obtain that
〈F(x),x− x∗〉 = 0
which, using the cut property, implies that x is a solution.
F Proofs of Section 6.2
Proof of Corollary 4. We apply Lemma 4 to (46). Therefore, {x¯k} and {xk}k∈N
are bounded sequence and that they have a cluster point x¯. Moreover, 〈F(xk),x∗−
xk〉 → 0 and 〈F(x),x − x∗〉 = 0 but this contradicts the acute angle property
therefore x¯ is a solution.
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Proof of Corollary 5. We use the weak sharpness property in (46) to obtain
E
[
1
1− δ
∥∥x¯k+1 − x∗∥∥2 |Fk
]
+ E
[
δ
∥∥xk+1 − x¯k∥∥2 |Fk] ≤
≤ 1
1− δ
∥∥x¯k − x∗∥∥2 + δ2 ∥∥xk − x¯k−1∥∥2 + 4λ2kE [∥∥ǫk∥∥2 |Fk]
− 2λkc min
x
∗∈SOL(F,Ω)
‖x− x∗‖+ 4λ2k
∥∥F(xk)∥∥2
Applying lemma 4, {x¯k} and {xk}k∈N are bounded sequence and that they have
a cluster point x¯. Moreover, min
x
∗∈SOL(F,Ω) ‖x− x∗‖ → 0 and ‖x¯− x∗‖ = 0,
that is, x¯ is a solution.
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